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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaint iff/Respondent,

REPLY BRIEF
OF APPELLANTS

:

v*
GEORGE RAY NEELEY and
LYNN L. BELT,

:

Defendants/Appellants.

Case Nos. 20694 and 20710

:

STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is little dispute in the facts of this case.
It bears repeating, however, that respondent confesses that the
trial court erred

in the sentence imposed for the crime of

Criminal Trespass, an infraction.

The court imposed a sentence

of three months imprisonment, (R. 218-285) to run concurrently
with the terms of imprisonment for Burglary (0-5 years) and
Theft (1-15 years).

(See Respondent' ~ Brief at D

2, fn. 1)

Appellants agree with respondent that the trial court exceeded
its authority and the judgment should be modified accordingly.
POINT I
REVERSIBLE ERROR DID OCCUR WHEN THE TRIAL
JUDGE REFUSED TO RECUSE HIMSELF.
Respondent concedes

that

both

appellants

are

"on

equal footing" to advance the argument that the trial judge
should have recused himself, that error to recuse would inure
to the detriment of both appellants, and that the motion to
disqualify Judge Banks was timely filed.
p. 7)

(Respondent Brief,

Respondent also notes that this court "has suggested
that it would ordinarily be a better practice for a judqe to
disqualify himself or herself upon the filing of an affidavit
of bias or prejudice, even though the judqe may be entirely
(Respondent's Brief, p. 7 ) 1

free of those detractors,../.

Respondent then argues that the majority view in this
country is that recusal is not required "when the judqe was
involved as a prosecutor in a previous unrelated prosecution of
the same defendant."

(Respondent's Brief, p. 7-8)

What is the majority
issue is often open to question.

or minority view on a legal
What is clear from a careful

reading of the cases cited by the parties however, is that the
cognizable trend

is

toward

acceptance

of

a

rule

that any

appearance of impartiality by the trial judge mandate's recusal.
This trend

is best exemplified

by the very recent case of

Bradshaw v. McCotter, 785 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1986).

In

Bradshaw, the court granted Federal Habeas Corpus relief to a
state prisoner finding that the petitioner was not required to
show prejudice from the fact that one judge sitting on a state
appellate tribunal had been the state's prosecuting attorney at
the time of petitioner's prosecution and that his name had appeared on the states brief solely as a matter of protocal and

1. It is interesting to note that the suggestions of this
court have not always been heeded by the trial bench in the
State of Utah. See State v. Long, 36 U.A.R. 11, 14,
P.2d
(1986) .

courtesy.

The Fifth Circuit, in granting the petition, stated:
A fair tribunal requires not only an absence
of actual bias...(b)ut to perform its high
function in the best way justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice. (Citations omitted) A defendant's right to an
impartial tribunal is violated when a judge
deciding his case may have a direct interest
against him. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 523, 47 S.Ct. 437, 441, 71 L.Ed. 749
(1927) .
Whether or not Vollers actually participated
in Bradshaw's prosecution must be found to
be immaterial. The appearance of Vollers1
name on the prosecuting attorney's brief
undermined a fundamental aspect of our
criminal justice system: a judge's
neutrality. The separation between the
roles of prosecutor and judge must be
certain and inflexible. (Citations omitted)
We can only conclude that Bradshaw had
valid reason to feel that his appeal was
being decided by a judge who played a part
in his prosecution.
The court citing to the need for the appearance of

fairness states:
Finally, in the eyes of the public the
impartiality of justice is shattered.
There can be no footnote explanation
accompanying every possible instance where
the public might discover that the same
person is listed as a prosecutor and later
as a judge in the same case. We find that
Vollers should have disqualified himself in
this case.
There is no need to show prejudice. The
overt facts of this case show that the
probability of prejudice on the part of
the judge...is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. (Citations omitted)
Inasmuch as Judge Vollers' situation went
to the very core of our judicial system's
integrity, it cannot be considered harmless.
(Citations omitted)
The same lack of an appearance of fairness is clear

in the instant case when the trial judge actually made appearances
at a prior criminal trial of one of the appellants.
of Bradshaw is irrefutable.

The logic

Likewise, respondent cannot claim

that other judges were not available, since the Third Judicial
District Court encompasses not only the largest population base
in the State of Utah, but also has the largest number of trial
judges.2
Appellants respectfully submit the failure to recuse
Judge Banks denied them Due Process of Law and Equal Protection
of the Laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution
of the State of Utah as well as the statutes and rules of court
heretofore cited.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S ARE ENTITLED TO REVERSALS OF
THEIR CONVICTIONS ON THE GROUND THAT THEY
WERE NOT PROVIDED A COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF
THEIR PRELIMINARY HEARING.
Respondent concedes that appellants were entitled to
a complete

preliminary

hearing

transcript, but

argues

that

demonstrable prejudice must be shown before a reversal is required in the instant case.

Again, although there is a diver-

2. As noted in Appellant's Brief, p. 3, Judge Fishier seemed
to accept this when he stated:
My thinking would be if I could check around
the district court and see if we could find
a judge who could just trade calendars with
Judge Banks. (R. 901)

gence in authority, the better rule as stated in appellant's
brief is that actual prejudice need not be shown.

This rule is

also of statutory origin in the State of Utah.
The Rules
circuit courts

of

of
the

Practice
State

in

of

the distict

Utah

provide

courts and

comprehensive

guidelines for the record of proceedings in the circuit court.
See Rules 6.1 - 6.6.
Prior to the enactment of the Circuit Court Act in the
State of Utahf the city courts and justice of the peace courts,
which handled much of the business which now falls within the
jurisdiction of the circuit courts, were not courts of record.
When making the circuit court a court of record and allowing
the use of electronic recording equipment as an alternative to
court transcribers, (see Rule 6.2) there was concern for the
fallibility of the devices to be employed and their operators.
Rule 6.5 was enacted, which provides:
The failure of the electronic recording
equipment to record properly because of
mechanical failure or error in operation
thereof by the operator in a court proceeding
shall be grounds for the granting of a new
trial except in those cases where the
portion of the verbatim record not recorded
is insignificant to the issues in the matter
before the court or would not affect the
possible points of appeal.
The portion of the preliminary hearing which was lost
covered portions

of

an

extensive

and

wide

ranging

cross-

examination of the state's chief witness against appellants.
The credibility of that witness, Bittner, was conceded by both
sides to be the issue at trial. During the preliminary hearing,

Bittner conceded that he had committed perjury at a previous
point in his examination, forcing

the court to suspend the

examination and appoint counsel for him.

It simply cannot be

concluded that this cross-examination was "insignificant".

It

is reasonable to assume that a man who had demonstrated a
willingness to lie on the witness stand once, might lie again.
It has been said that cross-examintion of a witness is "the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.3
And Chief Justice Berger has stated that questioning witnesses
is a valuable weapon in ascertaining the truth, particularly
when that

weapon

is

in the

hands

of

a

skilled

examiner:

It is the responsibility of the lawyer to
probe; testimonial interrogation, and crossexamination in particular, is a probing,
prying, pressing form of inquiry.
If a
witness evades, it is the lawyer's
responsibility to recognize the evasion and
to bring the witness back to the mark, to
flush out the whole truth with the tools of
adversary examination.4
Any experienced criminal lawyer knows that the vast
majority of cases are determined by the answers and the demeanor
of witnesses who testify before the trier of fact.

Factfinders

observing a live witness determine whether or not the witness
is honestly relating the facts, inadvertently misstating them,
or intentionally lying.
In this case one of the most effective uses of cross-

3. This statement is attributed to Professor Wigmore. Ladd &
Carlson, Cases and Materials on Evidence, (1972) at 125.
4.

Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1973).

c

examination, impeachment

by prior-inconsistant

statement, is

lost to the accused by the failure of the recording equipment.
Surely, the result is no different than havinq no transcript at
all, which required the reversal of Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1955).
POINT III
BECAUSE APPELLANTS DID REQUEST A LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION ON CRIMINAL
TRESPASS FOR THE BURGLARY CHARGE, THEY
CAN ARGUE THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY
REFUSED TO GIVE SUCH AN INSTRUCTION;
IN ADDITION, APPELLANTS WERE ENTITLED TO
THAT INSTRUCTION.
Respondent argues that appellants failed to request a
criminal trespass lesser included offense instruction of the
alleged burglary

which

occurred

on April 11, 1983.

It is

conceded that the trial court gave lesser included instructions
for criminal

trespass

(Infraction) for the charged

trespass (Class C Misdemeanor) which occurred
1983.

(Respondent's Brief, p. 11)

criminal

on March 20,

In fact, appellants were

convicted of this lesser and included offense.

It is true that

the colloquy between the court and counsel is somewhat confusinq
(Respondent's Brief, p. 11) That is at least in part due to the
trial court's submission of the lesser included offense instruction on criminal trespass (Class C Misdemeanor) but its failure
to do so on the burglary.

The totality of the colloquy between

counsel and the court on this point is as follows:

Mr. Yengich: I would take exception to the
court's failure to give my instruction, my
directed verdict instruction on Criminal
Trespass, Burglary and Theft, which are 18,
19 and 20, for the reasons previously argued in that there is not sufficient evidence
to send those to the jury*
I would except to the court's failure to
give my instruction on reasonable alternative hypothesis, at least in the Criminal
Trespass case. That is a circumstantial
case at best, and that instruction is appropriate in this case. I would also argue
it is proper in the other two counts.
I except to the court's failure to give my
instruction on lesser included offenses.
This is 5, 6, 7, and 8, lesser included
instruction on criminal trespass, an infraction on the burglary count. I do not know
how we can have criminal trespass on the
19th and not legitimately give an instruction to that effect on the 20th.
The court:

You mean for April 11th?

Mr. Yengich: I am sorry, April the 11th,
thank you, Judge.
The court: I don't know whether you said
you had a requested instruction. How did I
mark those?
Mr. Yengich:

You marked them "not given".

The court: I would deny the trespass on
the Burglary and Theft. I didn't on the
Class C. (Emphasis added)
Mr. Yengich: Okay. Just so we are clear.
There was some confusion as to the dates,
okay.
The court:
Just so the record is clear...
(Emphasis added)
Mr. Brown: Defendant's requested instruction no. 9, that was intended to be a
lesser included offense having to do with
the burglary, the alleged burglary, on
April the 11th, 1983, and the court has
indicated that you would not give the
lesser included on that.

The court:

On Burglary and Theft for the

infraction?
Mr. Brown:

Pardon?

The court: The infraction instruction on
Burglary and Theft?
Mr. Brown: No, the Criminal Trespass on
the 11th of April.
The court: Yes.
Mr. Brown: Then my instruction reads, "on
the 20th of March," and I amend that to the
"llth of April, 1983." That's the requested
lesser included on the lesser included
burglary. By error we put it the 20th of
March instead of the 11th of April.
The court: I marked those at the time, and
I advised you of them.
Mr. Brown: You indicated that you did not
feel a lesser included —
The court: I marked the ones as they were,
but I wouldn't have given a Criminal Trespass
on the Burglary and Theft.
Mr. Brown:

On April the 11th?

The court: I would not have given one of
those, either Burglary or Theft.
Mr. Brown: Instruction No. 11 is the
directed verdict request, and Instruction
No. 12 is a directed verdict request and
also No. 13. All three of these the court
denied. I would take my exceptions to
those.
Mr. Yengich's requested instruction concerning the corroboration of an accomplice, I
also—I didn't request that, but I have
indicated that that would be my request
also, that I felt that the corroboration of
an accomplice instruction was appropriate.
And I adopt that as my request also.
Mr. Yengich: Your honor, I would join in
Mr. Brown's exceptions. Mr. Shepherd and I

have discussed it. We will prepare — I
will prepare one that our lesser includeds
on the Burglary say the 20th of March
instead of the 11th of April.
I will
prepare new ones for the record so we have
a complete record, if that is okay with the
court. Mr. Shepherd has no objection to
that.
The court: Wellf I indicated to you verbally
that I didn't know that you had requested
that. But you did state that you did.
Mr. Yengich: Yes.
The court: In looking at your instructions
or your requested instructions, I couldn't
glean that from that, but it was discussed.
And I indicated I would not include it on
those.
As to 21, the language in there that is
really objectionable is that it has to be
viewed with caution. All of the instructions taken as a whole as to credibility of
the witnesses cover the rest of that instruction, as the court views it.
Anything else?
Mr. Yengich:

Nothing further.

Respondent argues that appellants' "appeared to object
to the courts failure to give a lesser included instruction on
Criminal Trespass

charge",

(Respondent's

Brief

at

p. 11);

however, the record makes clear that such an exception was
properly taken.
POINT IV
THE TPIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION REGARDING ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY.
Utah Code
giving of

Annotated,

a cautionary

§77-17-7

instruction

in

(1982) requires the

if the testimony

of an

accomplice is self contradictory, uncertain, or improbable. In
this case, the prosecution based almost all of its case on the
testimony of accomplice David Bittner, an admitted liar.
Bittner perjured

himself during

the preliminary

hearing

(R.

405), demonstrating his willingness to lie under oath when he
thought it

necessary

to

gain

credibility as a witness.
inconsistent testimony
prior and

present

an

advantage,

detroying

his

The state contends that Bittner's

"merely

indicated

testimony."

differences

(Respondent's

between

Brief, p. 14)

The difference, however, is the difference between truth and
falsity.
In general, accomplice

testimony

should

be viewed

with caution and distrust. As early as 1909, the United States
Supreme Court observed that accomplice testimony "ought to be
received with suspicion and with the greatest care and caution
and ought not to be passed upon by the jury under the same
rules governing

other

and

apparently

credible

witnesses."

Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 204 (1909).
Supreme Court explained that:
Common sense would suggest that he (the
accomplice) often has a greater interest in
lying in favor of the prosecution rather
than against it, especially if he is awaiting
his own trial or sentencinq. To think that
criminals will lie to save their fellows
but not to obtain favors from the prosecution
for themselves is indeed to clothe the
criminal class with more nobility than one
might expect to find in the public at large.
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967).

The

The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
We recognize that an accomplice may be
motivated to falsify because of a desire to
blame someone else in connection with the
crime; or in the hope of obtaining leniency;
or in the very fact that he is involved
with crime may intend to impair his
credibility. These combine to justify
looking upon his testimony with caution...
State v. Sinclair, 389 P.2d 465 (Utah 1964).
In the instant case, the accomplice, David Bittner, was to be
paid by the police both before and after his testimony against
the defendants was given

(R. 573-575).

He was also granted

immunity from prosecution in exchange for his testimony.
Some surrounding jurisdictions have found accomplice
testimony so inherently suspect as to require the giving of an
instruction if the conviction was substantially obtained through
the use
P.2d 486

of

accomplice

(Alaska

App. 1982).

testimony.

See

Anthony v. State, 512

1974); Price v. State, 647 P.2d

611

(Alaska

The State of Washington has found that because of

the strong self interest of the accomplice "it is always the
better practice

for

a

trial

court

to

give

the

cautionary

instruction whenever accomplice testimony is introduced."
State v. Harris, 685 P.2d 584 (Wash. 1984).
Many federal courts require that juries be cautioned
regarding accomplice

testimony.

The

Tenth

Circuit

has

held

that even though an accomplice is capable of being a competent
and truthful witness and that a conviction may be based upon
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, if believed by a
jury, "the rule is established in this circuit, however, that

testimony of accomplices must be carefully scrutinizedr weighed
with great care and received with caution."
Birmingham, 444 F.2d

United States v.

1313f 1317 (19th Cir. 1971).

See also,

United States v. Owens, 460 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1972).
The present case raised more than the inherent
general suspicion of accomplice credibility.

In this case, the

accomplice destroyed whatever credibility he had by lying under
oath about receiving money from the police. His willingness to
lie under oath, especially concerning his role as a testifying
accomplice, renders all of his testimony suspect and uncertain.
Where the accomplice is an admitted perjurer, and especially
where the prosecution has based

its case almost exclusively

upon the accomplice's testimony, reason, fairness and justice
demand that the jury be cautioned regarding such testimony.
The state contends that Utah Code Annotated, §77-17-7
only requires the trial judge to give a cautionary instruction
where "self contradictory, uncertain or improbable accomplice
testimony is uncorroborated.

The appellant contends that this

is far too restrictive an interpretation.

A proper reading of

the statute requires the trial judge to give the instruction if
the testimony of the accomplice is "self contradictory, uncertain
or improbable,"

whether or not it is corroborated.

The statute reads as follows:
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
(2) In the discretion of the court, an
instruction to the jury may be given to the
effect that such uncorroborated testimony

should be viewed with caution, and such an
instruction shall be given if the trial
judge finds the testimony of the accomplice
to be self contradictory, uncertain or
improbable. (emphasis added)
Section 2 of the statute is divided into two distinct
clauses.

The first allows the trial court the discretion to

give the instruction if the testimony is uncorroborated.
However, the use of

the word

"shall" in the second

clause

requires the giving of the instruction if the testimony is self
contradictory, uncertain or improbable.

If the testimony of

the accomplice is inherently self contradictory, uncertain or
improbable, even evidence which tends to be corroborative cannot
lend it

sufficient

credibility

to

outweigh

the

need

for a

cautionary instruction.
However, even if the state's interpretation is
accepted, the prosecution did not present sufficient corroboration in this case to overcome the prejudicial effect of omitting
the cautionary instruction.

In other jurisdictions, whether

failure to give the cautionary instruction is reversible error
depends upon the extent of corroboration.
P.2d 584 (Wash. 1984).

State v. Harris, 685

See also State v. Moore, 622 P.2d 631

(Kan. 1981).
In Utah, the rule is that the corroborating evidence
must connect the defendant with the commission of the offense
and be consistent with his guilt

and

inconsistent with his

innocence and that the evidence must do more than cast a grave
suspicion on the defendant.

Further, the corroboration must do

all of these things without the aid of the testimony of the
accomplice.

State v. Vigil, 260 P.2d

539

(Utah

1953).

See

also State v. Jones, 656 P.2d 1012 (Utah 1982).
In this case, the only evidence connecting the
defendants to the crimes of burglary and theft was the testimony
of the accomplice, David Bittner.

The testimony of the owner,

receptionist and police officers did not provide

sufficient

corroborating evidence to outweigh the need for a cautionary
instructions.

The owner testified that Bittner

came to him

claiming the appellants were going to burglarize his business,
at which point, relying upon Bittner1s word, he contacted the
police.

(R. 520)

The receptionist

only testified that she

found that

things on her desk had been "dislocated" around

March 20.

(R. 494-495)

No evidence was presented that could

possibly convict the defendants of burglary and theft.

The

police officers, relying solely upon the word of David Bittner,
testified to setting up a sting operation with Bittner and the
business owner.

(R. 549-551)

They

testified

to observing

Bittner and appellants enter the building through the door. (P.
555)

They testified to observing Bittner and appellants exit

the building after approximately one hour inside.

(R. 556-557)

They testified that they found items moved from one place to
another within

the

building.

(R.

603-604)

None

of

this

testimony is inconsistent with the explanation given by appellants.

(R. 719-736)

The only evidence that appellants were

engaged in the crimes of burglary and theft was the testimony
of David Bittner, an accomplice and admitted perjurer.

The

prosecution based nearly its entire case upon Bittner's testimony.
The appellants are not arguing that the instruction
should have been

given

"simply because Bittner's

different from defendants"•
admission of previous
credibility as

(Respondent's Brief, p. 14) Bittner's

perjury

a witness.

story was

cast

(R. 405)

serious

doubt

Given this

upon his
fact, the

insufficiency of corroborating evidence and the inherent suspicion of accomplice

testimony

in general, the trial

court's

refusal to give the requested instruction on accomplice testimony
was reversible error.
CONCLUSION
The appellants respectfully submit that their convictions should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this
1986.

/ y

day of August,
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APPENDIX

A F F I D A V I T
STATE OF UTAH
ss .
County of Salt Lake

:

GLENN K. IWASAKI, being first duly sworn, deposes and states
as follows:

1.

That I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the

State of Utah,
2.

That on June 1, 1983, I received a telephone call from

the clerk of Judge Eleanor S. Lewis (now VanSciver) at approximately 1:50 p.m., during which I was informed that Judge Lewis
requested my assistance with a witness who had testified at a Preliminary Hearing earlier in the morning to advise him as to the
possible ramifications of perjured and/or inconsistent statements.
3.

I arrived at the Circuit Court a little after 2:00 p.m.

and met with DAVID JOSEPH BITTNER and discussed with him the
events of the day.
4.

After conversation with Mr. Bittner, Ronald Yengich,

defense counsel, and Richard S. Shepherd, Deputy Salt Lake County
Attorney, it became evident that Mr. Bittner had made contradictory answers to the same questions proposed by Mr. Yengich.
5.

Judge Eleanor S. Lewis (VanSciver) was concerned about

the possibility of perjury and requested my assistance in sorting
out the events.
6.

While it appeared that Mr. Bittner did in fact make con-

flicting statements in his testimony, the position of Deputy Salt

Lake County Attorney Richard Shepherd was that Mr. Bittner had
changed his answer and had explained his previous inconsistency
pursuant to further examination both on cross and redirect.
7.

That based upon his complete testimony, no further action

against Mr. Bittner was pursued by the Salt Lake County Attorney's
Office.
DATED this

\i

u

day of August, ia

GLENN K. IWASAKI
Attorney at Law
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me th

is£M-day

of August, 1986.
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My commission expires:

m
RYPUl
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PUBLIC residing at:

June 19, 1988

Salt Lake City, Utah

